On October 27, EUSP Provost Veljko Vujačić presented his new book, a comparative historical study of the fall of two states—the USSR and Yugoslavia to colleagues, students and university guests
The similarity of the Soviet and Yugoslavian regimes can be observed both at the political level (the right of nations to self-determination, the desire for the
balanced development of republics representing their own nations and languages) and the ideological (patriotic socialism, the friendship of peoples, perception of the Army as heroic fighters against fascism for the communist idea). The risks in these ethnic federations were also similar: slogans about brotherhood did not find an application in a consistent communist policy, internal contradictions arose between more- and less-developed regions, and the impetus toward independent statehood matured in the institutionalization of republics.
The history of the USSR and of Yugoslavia ended in an equally sudden and stunning manner, but the Soviet Union’s peaceful collapse stands in stark contrast to the cruel dismemberment of Yugoslavia. There were, of course, conflicts within Soviet territory, though these were on the periphery (Armenia, Azerbaijan), while numerically dominant nations peacefully dispersed according to the borders of existing republics—Russia in this case dispassionately leaving 25 million Russians outside the newly formed nation state (the greatest humanitarian catastrophe, in Vladimir Putin’s definition). Yugoslavia’s own nucleus was exploded in the struggle between ethnic groups not wanting to reconcile with existing borders or to give up their own “brothers” to the clutches of new state formations where they would become the minority.
The scenarios in both cases represent paradoxes, considering that Yugoslavia for decades had successfully developed social institutions, the private sector, cultural openness, liberalism, etc. (thus giving a Soviet person the impression of a capitalist country)—that is, it ought to have been concerned with stability, or, at the very least, with a bloodless separation. The history of the Soviet Union’s development, on the contrary, presents itself as a series of plagues on the memories of the people: forced ethnic relocation, collectivization, Holodomor, etc.—all of this could at any time have come back to haunt the state and generate a national struggle.
So why did the states split up according to such different and unexpected scenarios?
The reasons must be sought in the autonomous ideas of political cultures and in collective assumptions about the role of the state in the life of the nation. In this context collective memory plays a large role, which, according to Max Weber, is based on historical experience.
If the Serbs were dominant in the communist politics of Yugoslavia and directly associated with the state, then the Russians were at least the “older brothers” of other peoples. In the USSR communism was perceived not as Russian, but rather as a Soviet regime (which, by its own ethnic policy was more likely anti-Russian). For decades Russian culture had been in opposition to the Soviet, while Serbian culture, on the other hand, supported Yugoslavian statehood.
This experience of history led to the formation of a differing collective memory.
In this context, there were military calls to mobilization in both: in the USSR they appealed to the ordinary Soviet people, while in Yugoslavia they were addressed to national patriotic sentiment.
The image of the state-machine torturing its own people arose in Soviet consciousness even before Khrushchev, in the period of de-Stalinization. And by perestroika the highly educated Russian society avidly drew historical truth from the publication of previously banned works like never before. In this way, a symbolic cultural heritage played its own role in the lack of resistance to the Soviet Union’s collapse.
The absence of the state’s oppression of their own society in 20th century Serbian history allowed for an uninterrupted collective memory not distracted by new realities, while preserving the idea of Yugoslavia as a nation state founded in 1918. The ideological struggle for state heritage became the basis of ethnic discord. The memory of the fascist terror against the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia also served as the impetus for Serbian solidarity in this struggle, and the pain of ethnic relations mobilized nationalities under the banner of nationalism.
Ultimately the collective memory of nations found resonance in the political and economic context in the speeches of leaders (especially the figures of Yeltsin and Milosevic), and in Yugoslavia this resonance generated a stronger shock wave than in the USSR.
Multinational states may preserve statehood under conditions of the absolute status of their main nation. Once the Serbs felt that their power in the Yugoslavian state had decreased, their particularism assumed an aggressive impulse. In the Soviet case, the history of the rupture in identifying the state with the Russian nation had deep roots, and by the end of the 1980s had, in the minds of the Russian elite, gradually reached a boiling point.
A fair amount of time has passed since the formation of the new states. And, it seems, the heirs of the communist past are more worried about getting rid of the remnants of the former regime than about the ethnic component of self-determination, though the developments of recent history suggest otherwise.
The urgency of the issues raised in this study is reflected in events going on before our very eyes. Even if it doesn’t explain the reasons for them, Veljko Vujačić’s book offers to at least review their historical and cultural backgrounds as well as to take a look at the unique history of a country, for someone native, from a new angle—from the unique history of another.
Veljko Vujačić. Nationalism, Myth, and the State in Russia and Serbia: Antecedents of the Dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. NY, Cambridge University Press, 2015. 336 p.
Kristina Emelyanenko
