Speaker: Oleg Rubanov, London Business School, London, United Kingdom
Date & time: 9 February, 17.00, Golden hall
The Job talk of the applicant for the vacant post of professor of economics with specialization in microeconomics, game theory and industrial organization. Please note that the presentation will be in English.
Strategic information transmission, commonly referred to as “cheap talk”, was first introduced by Crawford and Sobel (1982), who showed that there is only a limited amount of information that can be transmitted from an informed sender to an uninformed receiver. This paper shows that it is possible to achieve high precision of information transmission with multiple senders by constructing an equilibrium which converges to full revelation exponentially fast with the number of senders. This equilibrium is robust to small perturbations, unlike previous attempts to achieve full revelation with multiple senders in this setting. The equilibrium can also be constructed for multidimensional state-spaces and achieves arbitrarily high precision even if each sender is only allowed to send two types of messages.
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