Party Politics in Russia: From Competition to Hierarchy

VLADIMIR GEL’MAN

In the 1990s, political parties in Russia suffered from their under-development. By contrast, in the 2000s they became major actors in the electoral and parliamentary arenas, both at the national and sub-national level. However, party competition—the very heart of democratic politics—virtually disappeared in Putin’s Russia. Instead, all political parties became effectively controlled by the Kremlin and incorporated into the formal and informal hierarchy of Russia’s government. While the major opposition parties were about to become extinct, the party of power, United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya), overwhelmingly dominated the landscape of party politics. Still, by the end of Putin’s second term Russia’s political regime combined some elements of both personalist and party-based authoritarianism. I will analyse the formation of the new party system in Russia in the 2000s, with a special emphasis on the role of political elites and institutional engineering in the building of the dominant party and centralised control. The prospects for a party-based authoritarian regime in Russia are also discussed.

Trends in Russia’s party system

On 17 December 2007 the congress of United Russia (UR), Russia’s leading party, which had just received 64.3% of the vote and won 315 out of the 450 seats in the State Duma elections held two weeks before this event, met in Moscow. The congress nominated UR candidates for the three top posts in Russian officialdom: the president (Dmitry Medvedev), the prime minister (outgoing president Vladimir Putin), and the chairman of the Duma (Boris Gryzlov). Besides that, 65 out of 85 regional chief executives and four members of the cabinet of ministers during the 2007 elections ran on the UR party list, which was led by Putin. Another top official post, the chairman of the Federation Council, was occupied by Sergei Mironov, the leader of another pro-Kremlin party, Just Russia (JR, Spravedlivaya Rossiya), and yet another member of the cabinet of ministers ran on the JR party list. This was clear evidence of the spectacular rise of the influence of party politics (if not party government) in Putin’s Russia in comparison with Yel’tsin’s period.

Russia’s party system in the 1990s demonstrated several distinctive features in comparison with post-communist party systems in Eastern Europe. First, Russia’s party system was greatly fragmented, because all segments of Russia’s electoral
markets were over-supplied. Second, the very high level of electoral volatility demonstrated great elasticity in voter demands. Third, non-partisan politicians who possessed resources other than party support (mainly backed by regional or sectoral interest groups) also played a major role in national and especially sub-national electoral politics (Gel’man 2006; Golosov 2004a; Hale 2006). For these reasons, Russia’s party system is correctly regarded as unconsolidated. In the 2000s, trends in party politics were quite the opposite. Parties became the only legitimate actors in the national electoral and parliamentary arena, and non-party politicians no longer competed with them. Instead of the bizarre competition of dozens of small parties and coalitions, only four parties enjoyed parliamentary representation over two consecutive legislative terms (2003–2007 and 2007–2011), and together received almost 92% of the vote in the December 2007 elections. Finally, both national and sub-national executives, who in the 1990s stayed above and beyond party politics, became loyal partisans by the late 2000s.

To a certain degree, the dynamics of party politics in post-Soviet Russia demonstrated a pendulum-like effect (Gel’man 2006, pp. 547–48). After breaking the equilibrium of Soviet-style one-party rule, Russia’s party system switched to hyper-fragmentation in the mid-1990s, when 43 parties competed for popular votes during the 1995 parliamentary elections. During the 2000s, the pendulum swung back to low fragmentation against the background of the monopoly held by the party of power. According to the data presented in Table 1, the effective number of legislative parties in the State Duma after 2003 dropped to 1.97 and then to 1.92. Therefore, all parties other than UR acting together do not have enough potential to form a meaningful alternative to it. In other words, Russia’s party politics in the 2000s

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Electoral parties*</th>
<th>Parliamentary parties</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994–1995</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>8.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996–1999</td>
<td></td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000–2001</td>
<td>5.34</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001–2003**</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>2.25</td>
<td>1.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007–2008</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The effective number of parties is calculated as: \( \frac{1}{\sum v^2} \), where ‘v’ is the share of votes (or State Duma seats) for each respective party. The effective number of electoral parties is based upon the results of respective State Duma elections, and the effective number of parliamentary parties is based upon the actual composition of parliamentary parties in the State Duma in respective years. The data draws heavily upon Gel’man (2006, p. 546).

*Calculated on the basis of party list voting.

**After the establishment of United Russia, four parliamentary parties—Unity, Fatherland–All Russia, Regions of Russia and People’s Deputy—are calculated as a single party.
developed as an amalgamation of two inter-related trends: the emerging dominance of the party of power at the electoral and parliamentary levels; and the continuing decline (if not a total extinction) of opposition of different kinds (see Table 2). Unlike in the post-communist party systems of Eastern Europe or those in post-Soviet Moldova and Ukraine, the pendulum of Russia’s party system raced through the position of democratic equilibrium (involving moderate fragmentation of the party system) to a new non-democratic equilibrium: rather, the decline of party fragmentation led to decline of party competition, which is the necessary (although not sufficient) condition for democracy.

After the triumphant 2007 State Duma elections, UR finally turned into a dominant party. This can be defined as a party that is established by and closely tied to the rulers of an authoritarian regime; freely employs state power and resources to maintain its dominance; and uses extra-constitutional means to control the outcomes of politics during elections and beyond (Gel’man 2006; Reuter & Remington forthcoming). The rise of UR as a dominant party coincided with the sharp destruction of Russia’s major democratic institutions, including (although certainly not limited to) competitive elections (Fish 2005; McFaul & Stoner-Weiss 2008). Domestic and international observers widely regarded them as unfair. The blatant abuse of state resources for election purposes, one-sided media coverage, administrative pressure and intimidation toward voters, and (last but not least) electoral fraud, became routine in Russia’s electoral politics, which, alongside many other states in the world, has been dubbed ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2006). One may conclude that while Russia’s nascent political regime in the 1990s (whether democratic or not) was by and large non-party-based, Russia’s emerging non-democratic regime in the 2000s became increasingly party-based. Political scientists are largely agreed on the ‘indispensability’ of political parties for democracy (Lipset 2000), but the same argument might be relevant for some non-democracies, too, as Russia’s Soviet and post-Soviet politics suggests.

Why and how did Russia experience this turn in party politics? Why did political parties as such and, especially United Russia, known as ‘the party of power’, become major tools of the ruling elite? And what are the prospects for a dominant party-based authoritarian regime in Russia? This contribution seeks answers to these questions. First, I examine varieties of authoritarian regime building in the post-Soviet context and analyse the strategies and choices of Russia’s leaders within this framework. Second, I present an analysis of the dynamics of party politics under Putin, with a special emphasis on features of the new party system and the role of political and institutional factors in its formation. Then, I draw some parallels with party-based authoritarianism in Mexico under the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and focus on similarities and differences with Russia’s trends and prospects. Finally, the effects of party politics on political regime dynamics in Russia will be considered.

**Why party?: strategies of authoritarian regime building and the Kremlin’s choice**

All rulers in the world would like to govern their countries without checks or balances. In established regimes, however, they are faced with constraints that are based upon institutions or other influential actors (both domestic and international). No wonder
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Parties</th>
<th>1999</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2007</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of lists</td>
<td>Party list vote, %</td>
<td>Seats, total (PR + SMD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turnout, %</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>55.75</td>
<td>63.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fatherland–All Russia (FAR)</td>
<td>13.3*</td>
<td>68 (37 + 31)</td>
<td>37.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>23.3**</td>
<td>73 (64 + 9)</td>
<td>11.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Russia (UR)</td>
<td>6.0***</td>
<td>17 (17 + 0)</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LDPR</td>
<td>24.3</td>
<td>113 (67 + 46)</td>
<td>12.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motherland</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>20 (16 + 4)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Just Russia (JR)</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>29 (24 + 5)</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPRF</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>25 (0 + 25)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yabloko</td>
<td>105 (0 + 105)</td>
<td>60 (0 + 60)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>94.7</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parties over 5% (7%) threshold</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>81.2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against all lists</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid votes</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *Taken over by ‘United Russia’.
**Transformed into ‘United Russia’.
***Listed as ‘Zhirinovskii’s Bloc’

that leaders in newly established states and nations are often more successful in authoritarian regime building from scratch if they are able to remove these constraints and eliminate alternatives to their governments. Comparative studies of authoritarianism offer a useful distinction between personalist, party-based and military authoritarian regimes, which form on different power bases and employ different strategies of dominance. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union, post-Soviet states demonstrated a wide spectrum of personalist authoritarian regimes, although some of them were destroyed in the period 2003–2005 during the wave of co-called ‘colour revolutions’ in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. In this respect, Russia exhibited a rather distinctive pattern of authoritarian regime building. While its ‘hybrid’ regime under Yel’tsin in the 1990s was largely personalist, despite several unsuccessful attempts to establish pro-Kremlin ‘parties of power’, Russia’s authoritarian turn under Putin in the 2000s coincided with the spectacular rise of United Russia, the ‘party of power’, which dominated the electoral and parliamentary arenas by the end of Putin’s rule. In the course of the 2000s, the Kremlin invested deliberate and thorough efforts into building a dominant party, which greatly contributed to the continuity of Russia’s authoritarian regime beyond the leadership succession in 2008. Given the fact that party-based authoritarian regimes are usually the longest-lived in comparison with personalist and military regimes (Geddes 2003, pp. 47–88), this Kremlin strategy might be very rational in the long-term.

Why did the Kremlin choose this strategy after Putin’s unexpected rise to power in 1999 and 2000? To a great extent, this choice was driven by the learning effect from Russia’s own experience under Yel’tsin as well as from other post-Soviet states. Yel’tsin’s personalist regime was heavily unpopular in the eyes of Russia’s citizens due to its poor performance, but it was faced with a deeply fragmented elite, which was organised around multiple cliques and clans of oligarchs and regional leaders. This constellation left Yel’tsin room for manoeuvre, using ‘divide and conquer’ strategies, but it was rather risky in terms of leadership succession, as the experience of some post-Soviet states (especially the Ukrainian ‘orange revolution’) suggests (Hale 2005; Reuter & Remington forthcoming). In Russia, presidential turnover produced a shift in loyalty of formerly subordinated elites, which established a loose coalition ‘Fatherland–All Russia’ on the eve of the 1999–2000 parliamentary and presidential elections and threatened the very survival of Yel’tsin and his entourage. Even though the Kremlin then was able to avoid this outcome due to successful electoral campaigning and manufacturing its own political vehicle, Unity (Edinstvo) (Colton & McFaul 2003; Sakwa 2003; Shvetsova 2003), the post-Yel’tsin elites had little intention of falling into the same trap. Beyond these short-term considerations, Putin and his associates sought to establish long-term bases for the stability and continuity of Russia’s emerging political regime. This task was three-fold. First, they had to monopolise and strengthen the instruments of their administrative control over the political and policy agenda in order to impose their will on all segments of the elite. Second, they had to prevent any opportunities for alternative coordination among elites by the demolition or co-optation of all independent organisational entities (such as parties, interest groups, NGOs and the media). Third, they had to ensure the long-term loyalty of elites and masses to the status quo regime, irrespective of its performance, personal qualities of leadership and the like.
From this perspective, a ‘soft’ version of a personalist authoritarian regime, which had emerged in Russia by the early 2000s, was the least useful instrument, because regimes of this kind are most vulnerable to lose their equilibrium in comparison with other authoritarianisms. Thus, Russia’s rulers had to choose between two different strategies of long-term authoritarian regime building. One option was a ‘hard’ version of personalist authoritarianism, in the manner of Belarus or Turkmenistan, which would base the loyalty of elites and masses through the intense use of coercion toward them. But this strategy would be costly for the Kremlin: quite apart from the need for huge investment in a large-scale coercion apparatus, which would diminish the threat of major disobedience, such regimes could be faced with the danger of international isolation and political turmoil in case of leadership succession. And also, given the fact that elites in ‘hard’ personalist authoritarian regimes could become victims of repression more often than ordinary citizens, Russia’s ruling class had no incentive to launch such a risky enterprise.

In the terms elaborated by Robert Dahl (1971, p. 15), in Russia’s post-communist setting the costs of repression were incredibly high. An alternative to a ‘soft’ party-based authoritarian regime looked much more attractive for both the Kremlin and the various segments of the elite. It could successfully solve all three above-mentioned problems: the establishment of monopolist control, the prevention of alternative coordination, and the building of long-term loyalty; but was less coercive and thus less costly for the Kremlin than ‘hard’ personalist authoritarianism. Indeed, it could lower the regime’s costs of toleration without the risk of the loss of power due to open political contestation (Dahl 1971). Also, a ‘soft’ party-based authoritarianism would be very functional and instrumental for rulers in three other respects: it could enhance the regime’s legitimacy due to both efficient political patronage and discouragement of alternatives to the status quo (Greene 2007); it could effectively and flexibly perform policy adoption and implementation due to the non-ideological nature of the dominant party (Hanson 2003; Hale 2006; Gel’man 2006); and it would maintain elite consolidation and recruitment through mutually reinforcing bureaucratic and political mechanisms of control.

However, while the choice of this strategy of authoritarian regime building might bring long-term and large-scale benefits to the Kremlin, it also required a significant amount of political investment with a relatively long compensation period. Even though the political environment of Putin’s Russia was very advantageous for the Kremlin’s authoritarian regime building due to the recentralisation of the Russian state, unprecedented economic growth and the monopolisation of control over major economic assets, political and institutional engineering as well as organisational efforts were vital for this venture. The turning of a non-party-based regime into an emerging party-based authoritarian dominance was achieved as a result of the following deliberate and conscious steps.

In 2001, the party of power, United Russia, was established in the form of a ‘hostile takeover’ of the formerly regional-based coalition ‘Fatherland–All Russia’ (Otechestvo–Vsya Rossiya) and two small parliamentary groups by the Kremlin-sponsored movement, Unity. The newly-born party gained a majority in the State Duma and unequivocally supported virtually all bills proposed by Putin and his government (Smyth 2002; Remington 2003). Thus, UR established its parliamentary
dominance. In 2003, the United Russia party list received 37.6% of votes during the State Duma elections, but the implicit coalition policy of the party of power in single-member districts and further institutional changes of internal parliamentary rules led to the formation of a ‘manufactured super-majority’: UR soon acquired more than two-thirds of the seats in the national legislature (Golosov 2007). Not only was UR’s parliamentary dominance strengthened, but also alternatives to it became irrelevant.

In 2001–2003, the Kremlin and the State Duma launched a reform of regional electoral systems in order to improve the performance of UR in regional legislatures and win centralised political control over the periphery (Golosov 2004a). Despite the fact that in 2003–2004 UR gained a significant share of votes in many regional legislative elections, it represented only a limited success for the party of power: its local branches performed well if they were captured by regional governors and served merely as their (rather than the Kremlin’s) political vehicle (Golosov 2004b; Kynev 2006). Also, governors often based their support on parties other than UR or on non-party entities. But after the abolition of gubernatorial elections in early 2005, the incentives were reversed: the appointment and further survival of regional chief executives largely depended on their loyalty to UR (Goode 2007; Reuter & Remington forthcoming). No wonder that most of them either voluntary or forcefully joined the ranks of the party of power. United Russia, in turn, established majorities in almost all regional legislatures and by 2007 achieved regional dominance: with some exceptions, regional politics no longer produced meaningful alternatives to UR.

From 2003 the Kremlin initiated a new wave of institutional changes, which were oriented toward further shrinking the field of party competition. The electoral threshold for parliamentary representation in the State Duma and most regional legislatures increased from 5% to 7%. The new federal law on political parties toughened many organisational and membership requirements for political parties, which had to re-register according to the new conditions. This reform significantly raised the entry barrier to Russia’s market of party politics: the formation of new political parties has become very difficult, while only 15 out of 46 previously existing Russian parties by 2007 managed to squeeze in according to these rules and were able to participate in the December 2007 State Duma election. Also, pre-election party coalitions (blocs) from 2005 were prohibited altogether, thus rendering the survival of small party entities very problematic (Wilson 2006). Finally, the recent reform of the State Duma electoral system (the shift from mixed to party list representation), not only increased UR’s own party discipline and loyalty to the Kremlin (Remington 2006; Smyth et al. 2007), but also helped the party of power in gaining its electoral dominance during the 2007 parliamentary elections. While many factors, ranging from unfair campaigns to the high approval rate of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin ensured UR’s success, no other party could present a viable electoral alternative to the party of power.

The emergence of parliamentary, regional, and electoral dominance of the party of power made questionable the use of traditional classifications of parties in democratic polities such as ‘left versus right parties’, ‘mass versus cadre parties’, ‘programmatic versus clientelist parties’, and the like (Duverger 1954; Mair 1990; Kitschelt et al. 1999) in conditions of a party-based authoritarian regime in Russia. Rather, Russia’s new party system is better understood through the criteria of parties’ loyalty to the
Kremlin. While this (purely ad hoc) classification would be based on continuum and not on dichotomy (in fact, no political party in today’s Russia is fully independent of the presidential administration), for the sake of further analysis I will take the liberty to present Russia’s party system as a kind of multi-layered pie (Wilson 2005, pp. 119–50), with three hierarchical layers: first, the dominant party, United Russia; second, its satellites, which include JR, Vladimir Zhirinovskii’s LDPR (Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Liberal’no-demokraticheskaya partiya Rossi), and some other small ‘pocket parties’; and third, its enemies, which include the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF, Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Rossii) and Yabloko.

The new party system in the making: United Russia, its satellites and its enemies

United Russia

Most political parties in the world were created by politicians in order to gain public office through a popular vote. The genesis of Russia’s parties of power was essentially different: UR, as well as its predecessors, Our Home is Russia (Nash dom Rossiya) and Unity, was crafted by top officials in order to maximise their control over political arenas (Hale 2006). This distinction undoubtedly affected major features of the party of power in Russia in three important aspects—party organisation, party ideology, and party government.

If one compares party organisation with those of firms, two basic models could be easily traced in a comparative perspective. In many well-established political parties in the world, a party’s own managers (or party apparatus) established its bureaucratic control over nominations, electoral strategy, policy agenda and the like. These trends were dubbed as ‘oligarchy’ almost a century ago (Michels 1911): in fact, they are similar to managerial control in corporate governance. An alternative, typical for many nascent parties in new democracies, is a clientelist intra-party organisation, which is based on personal loyalty and favouritism (Kitschelt et al. 1999)—a model similar to a family-run business. Unlike these two models, UR’s party organisation developed in a rather different way: it could be described as Kremlin-based ‘external governance’, which was independent of the party leadership. While UR party officials were merely in charge of everyday routine management (Reuter & Remington forthcoming), the key Kremlin officials served as extra-party rulers, who controlled strategic decision-making (Gel’man 2006, p. 553). Thus, the party of power can be compared to a firm whose assets are owned not by its management but by a large multi-sectoral holding company, which hired its management and personnel and could easily replace them from time to time. For example, in the wake of the 2003 State Duma election campaign the chair of the UR executive committee, Alexander Bespalov (a long-term Putin associate from St Petersburg), ‘voluntarily resigned’ and then received a post in Gazprom; almost all the central party apparatus has also been replaced. Before the 2007 State Duma elections, over a third of the former members of UR’s parliamentary party (mostly experienced MPs who served several legislative terms in the single-member districts) were not included in the party list, and therefore lost their seats regardless of the outcome of polls. From the perspective of corporate
control and management within the party, the ‘external governance’ model was more efficient in comparison with both bureaucratic oligarchy and personalist clientelism. ‘External governance’ soon turned the party of power into a highly disciplined and centralised organisation: no internal dissent or factionalism is tolerated, and even discussion within the party is strictly regulated by the Kremlin. One might speculate, though, that if Fatherland–All Russia had defeated Unity during the 1999 electoral conflict, the party of power would likely have had few chances to follow the model of ‘external governance’: rather, it would have become a loose coalition of clientelist-based factions.

The genesis of the party of power also affected its lack of ideology. Top state officials needed UR as an instrument for the preservation of the status quo but not as an instrument of political change. No wonder that UR openly and deliberately manifested its loyalty to Russia’s political regime and personally to Putin, while its position on major policy issues remained vague and indefinite. During the 2007 State Duma election campaign, UR’s major slogan was ‘Vote for Putin’s plan!’ (‘Golosui za plan Putina!’), without specific reference to the content of this ‘plan’. Some critics have argued that party ideology is necessary for long-term regime maintenance (Hanson 2003); however, in the short run UR’s non-ideology was an asset rather than a liability, because it contributed to the success of the party of power. Against the background of a decline in transitional uncertainty, the role of ideology as a product in Russia’s electoral market has shrunk. An in-depth analysis of the programmatic rhetoric of Russia’s parties in the 1995–2003 parliamentary elections demonstrated the trend for policy positions to converge (Popova 2007). Under these circumstances, UR enjoyed the merits of the median voter orientation of its policy positions: it is located near the zero point on the left–right continuum between pro-statist and pro-market parties. This is also true for any other axis of issue dimensions (for example, pro-Western vs. anti-Western issues) (Gel’man 2006, p. 554). The lack of ideology gave UR wide room for political manoeuvre that was unavailable for the disunited opposition. Indeed, the large policy distance between these parties creates major obstacles for the formation of a negative anti-regime consensus coalition, which would include the KPRF, on the one hand, and Yabloko and SPS, on the other (Gel’man 2005). In a comparative perspective, opposition parties under dominant party regimes (whether authoritarian or not) would also prefer the preservation of the status quo (continuity of dominant party rule) rather than the breakthrough to power of their ideologically distant counterparts (Greene 2007); Russia was not an exception here.

Finally, the genesis of the party of power doomed it to play a subordinate role in policy adoption and implementation: to put it bluntly, the top Kremlin officials needed party politicians as obedient followers rather than as autonomous partners. This produced a great asymmetry in terms of party government: while top federal and, especially, regional executive officials joined UR, rank-and-file party members (even its MPs) were only occasionally rewarded by executive posts of secondary importance due to their personal fortunes rather than to party affiliation. Moreover, beyond the parliamentary and electoral arenas, the role of the party of power remains rather limited despite the aspirations of UR leaders. In February 2004, upon the resignation of Mikhail Kasyanov’s cabinet of ministers, UR announced its intention to be actively involved in the process of cabinet formation, but when Putin proposed the virtually
unknown Mikhail Fradkov as the new prime minister, who formed his cabinet without any serious influence on the part of UR, the party of power had no choice other than unanimous support, and its presence in the government was merely symbolic. During Fradkov’s (2004–2007) and Viktor Zubkov’s (2007–2008) governments, four members of the cabinet (deputy prime minister Alexander Zhukov, and ministers Sergei Shoigu, Alexei Gordeev and Yuri Trutnev) were members of UR, but they held these posts by subordination to the president rather than to UR, and by no means exercised party influence on governmental policies (Gelman 2006, pp. 551–52). Quite the opposite, it was the party of power which pushed governmental policy through the State Duma and was forced to take up the challenge of political responsibility for unpopular policies, such as social benefits reform launched in January 2005. [After this reform, UR’s performance in regional legislative elections was the lowest ever (Kynev 2006).] The negligible effect of UR on policy making to a large degree was a by-product of Russia’s institutional design and its notoriously overwhelming presidential power, which diminished the role of other actors and agencies (Huskey 1999; Shevchenko 2004; Fish 2005). It was similar to that in Mexico, where presidentialism coincided with a party-based authoritarian regime for decades (Weldon 1997). The dominant party, PRI, despite the pervasive presence of its members in all levels and branches of government, merely approved proposals initiated by the president and his cabinet of technocrats (‘technicos’) rather than serving as a key active actor in the policy-making process (Purcell 1973; Story 1986). In a similar vein, Putin’s approach to government and policy making was ostensibly technocratic (Sakwa 2004), thus leaving little room for party politics.

These features of United Russia as a dominant party—‘external governance’, non-ideology, and its secondary role in policy making—produced certain consequences for Russia’s emerging party-based authoritarianism. In sharp contrast to the Soviet experience of Communist Party rule, which was best characterised as a ‘party-state’ regime (Geddes 2003), UR dominance could be labelled as ‘state-party’: not only did the dominant party itself informally serve as a branch of the presidential administration, but party politics as a whole in Russia performed the same role.

**Satellites: Just Russia and others**

Post-communist Russia exhibited a strong record of active involvement of top executive officials not only in the building of dominant parties but also in the building of loyal or fake alternatives to them. These Kremlin-driven ‘projects’ served two basic—and not mutually exclusive—goals: first, to form a reserve or substitute to the party of power and avoid placing too many eggs in one basket (especially given the background of transitional uncertainty); and second, to weaken the oppositions of various colours by splitting their votes by spoiler parties (Wilson 2005). Attempts to pursue the first goal were demonstrated several times between the 1995 State Duma elections (‘Blok Ivana Rybkina’) and the 2003 parliamentary campaign (the People’s Party of the Russian Federation). Manifestations of the pursuit of the second goal have also been numerous, and the Kremlin used a wide array of political technologies. They ranged from the encouragement of dissident factions of opposition parties to form their own party lists [such as the SLON party led by the former deputy chair of
Yabloko, Vyacheslav Igrunov, which ran in the 2003 State Duma elections against his former party-mates (White 2006), to a hostile takeover of formerly non-Kremlin parties (such as the Democratic Party of Russia, which ran in the 2007 State Duma elections under the slogan of Russia’s prospective membership in the European Union, aiming to split the vote for liberal parties).

In the 2000s the Kremlin, facing an oversupply of potential satellite parties, was very active in ‘inventing the opposition’ (Wilson 2005, p. 187). Under its auspices, small left and nationalist parties established the ‘Motherland’ (‘Rodina’) coalition before the 2003 elections, which was led by popular politicians, Dmitri Rogozin and Sergei Glaz’ev. Its well funded and much publicised campaign under nationalist and populist slogans was oriented towards diminishing the vote for the Communists, and its electoral success exceeded initial expectations: ‘Motherland’ won 9.1% of the eligible vote and established a parliamentary party in the State Duma. Soon after this, however, the leaders of ‘Motherland’ escaped the Kremlin’s control: without permission, Glaz’ev ran in the presidential election of March 2004 and was expelled from the party’s ranks. Then, the aggressive nationalist campaigning of Rogozin and his party led to ‘Motherland’ being denied registration in several regional legislative elections: finally, in 2006 Rogozin was forced to resign from the post of party leader. He was replaced by the businessman Alexander Babakov, who was completely subordinated to the Kremlin (Titkov 2006).

The precipitate rise and fall of ‘Motherland’ led the Kremlin into another venture, a satellite party, which was intended to act both as a reserve to the party of power and to split the communist vote. In 2006, the Kremlin initiated the merger of three previously established satellite parties—the Party of Life (Partiya zhizni), led by Sergei Mironov, the post-Rogozin ‘Motherland’ party, and the Party of Pensioners (Partiya pensionerov) (whose leadership was also replaced due to the uncontrolled political activism of the party chair, Valerii Gartung). The formation of the new party, Just Russia, which declared its leftist policy position and employed extensive socialist rhetoric, has been perceived as a major step towards the establishment of a ‘managed’ two-party system in Russia. Vladislav Surkov, the chief Kremlin political strategist, even announced that while UR should remain the major Kremlin vehicle, or its ‘right leg’, JR would act as its substitute in the manner of its ‘left leg’, ‘if the right leg becomes numb’ (Maksimov 2006). Just Russia’s debut in the 2006–2007 regional legislative elections was relatively successful in some areas, where it was able to attract influential segments of regional elites, although this party did not attract many communist supporters. On the eve of the 2007 State Duma elections, polls showed a strong potential for electoral support for JR, and the ‘left leg’ party became a ‘Noah’s Ark’ for many politicians with a previous record of partisanship, ranging from the KPRF to Yabloko. When Vladimir Putin announced his decision to lead the UR party list in October 2007, it dealt a huge blow to JR prospects: Mironov and his party lost the major basis of their criticism toward UR, given their unquestionable personal loyalty to Putin. Although in the December 2007 election JR received 7.74% of the vote and became established as a parliamentary party, and (alongside UR and two other satellite parties) endorsed Medvedev’s nomination for the 2008 presidential election, its future as the Kremlin’s reserve became unclear.
Among satellite parties, the LDPR (*Liberal'no-demokraticheskaya partiya Rossii*) was probably the most valuable and long-standing Kremlin asset. From the very beginning, this party successfully combined nationalist and populist rhetoric with its fully fledged loyalty to the Kremlin. In fact, Zhirinovskii and his allies played two important roles. First, they endorsed major presidential and governmental proposals in the *Duma* (Remington 2003) and, more importantly, blocked several initiatives of the opposition (such as the attempt to impeach the president in May 1999). Second, they presented an image of a fake nationalist party, which was attractive to a number of voters without threatening the status quo (Wilson 2005, pp. 203–09). With the establishment of the parliamentary dominance of UR, the Kremlin no longer needed LDPR’s services in the *Duma*, but its presence on Russia’s electoral arena remained important given certain demands among voters (Gudkov & Dubin 2005) and the effective use of the LDPR in the Kremlin’s negative campaigning against selected targets (be they ‘oligarchs’, communists or somebody else). Yet, besides LDPR as fake nationalists, a number of fake left parties as well as fake liberals were always at the Kremlin’s disposal.

Russia’s experience of satellite party building is not unique in a comparative perspective. Besides some other post-Soviet states, such as Ukraine under Leonid Kuchma (Wilson 2005, pp. 129–50), one might recall some communist regimes in Eastern Europe, which established loyal peasant or Christian parties in Poland and East Germany as channels of political control over targeted social milieus. Also, the Mexican party-based authoritarian regime preferred co-optation over repression in its dealing with organised dissent (Anderson & Cockroft 1966; Cothran 1994) and also used various channels to promote a number of satellite parties, which aimed to take votes from the real opposition, especially in the wake of PRI’s decline in the 1980s and 1990s (Wilson 2005, p. 126). However, in Russia shrinking party competition provided additional incentives for satellite parties. Party politicians beyond UR were faced with a difficult choice between complete subordination and (relative) autonomy from the Kremlin: in fact, this was a choice between survival and possible extinction. Still, some parties that sought political autonomy remained in Russia’s political arena.

**Opposition: is there life after death?**

In the 1990s, political opposition (first anti-communist, and later communist) had a decisive impact on the emerging Russian party system. By contrast, in the 2000s both communist and liberal political oppositions not only dramatically lost their influence but appeared ready to disappear from the political arena, in the manner of a dying species (Gel’man 2005). Two major factors affected the collapse of Russia’s opposition parties, which became evident after the 2003 State *Duma* elections and continued over time. First, the institutional background of strong presidentialism was unfavourable for opposition politics by definition (Linz 1990; Fish 2005) and was accompanied by the institutional changes of the 2000s, such as an increase in the threshold for parliamentary representation, tough rules for party registration, and the prohibition on electoral coalitions. Second, in the 2000s, political competition in Russia became very limited due to the ‘imposed consensus’ of elites (Gel’man 2003); the Kremlin and UR dominated Russia’s political scene, and all remaining elite sections have had to
agree on their subordinated role or have lost their elite status as such. While elite fragmentation and conflict is likely for opposition-induced political protest (Tarrow 1994, pp. 88–89), the ‘imposed consensus’ left the opposition with no choice: it became co-opted or damaged, located at the periphery of the political arena, and no longer played the role of political actor. Under these circumstances, neither the KPRF, Yabloko nor the SPS were able to resolve the ‘classical problem of any opposition . . . how much to oppose and by what means’ (Przeworski 1991, p. 89): the choice of opposition strategies lies between ‘exit’, ‘voice’, and ‘loyalty’ (Hirschman 1970), but none of them brought Russian opposition parties any success in the 2000s.

The Communist Party of the Russian Federation exhausted its potential of ‘voice’ (of decisive anti-regime mass mobilisation) as early as 1996, and then they turned to ‘loyalty’ to the status quo regime under the slogan of ‘growing into power’ (‘vrastanie vo vlast’) (Gelman 2005, pp. 234–35). Since then, the KPRF attempted to be a junior partner of the ruling group; in 2000 the communists even reached an agreement with the Unity faction about sharing the chairships of parliamentary committees and still controlled the position of State Duma chairman. But bargaining gains were minimal: in fact, the very existence of a Kremlin-controlled majority in the State Duma undermined the position of the KPRF, which turned into a ‘cosmetic’ opposition (March 2002, pp. 240–44). During the 2003 State Duma elections, the KPRF became a major Kremlin target: vicious attacks on the communists, including large-scale negative coverage on television, Kremlin pressure on pro-communist governors and businesspeople, and the splitting of the electorate through the nomination of alternative party lists, led to the sharp electoral decline of the KPRF (Wilson 2005, pp. 222–65). It lost almost half of its vote in the 2003 State Duma elections, and KPRF success in regional elections after 2000 also declined (Golosov 2004a, 2004b). But even these conditions did not change the KPRF’s strategy: its policy positions, organisation and leadership remained nearly the same as in the 1990s. The party’s appeal to voters was oriented toward ‘back to the USSR’, the party was led by Soviet-style second-order bureaucrats, and party activists rejected any major innovations that could provoke major party changes (Ponomarev 2007). In fact, this immobilism helped the KPRF to preserve its organisation and electoral bases from a total collapse: the communists received 11.57% of the vote in the 2007 Duma election, and its performance in regional elections was relatively strong (Kynev 2006). At the same time, it pushed the KPRF into a narrow electoral ‘ghetto’ without any prospect of serious influence on politics and policy making: the Kremlin’s drive for exclusion of the KPRF from the political arena could provoke the communists to adopt an ‘exit’ strategy probably leading to their subsequent marginalisation.

Unlike the communists, Russia’s major liberal party, the SPS, as well as its predecessor, Democratic Choice of Russia, always occupied a niche of semi-opposition, which was not represented in the government, but which sought to join it without any significant changes in the political regime and/or of major policies (Gelman 2005, pp. 228–29). This strategy bore the SPS some fruit in the 1999 State Duma election, when the liberals backed Vladimir Putin and his military actions in Chechnya. Thanks to Kremlin support and positive TV coverage, the SPS received 8.5% of the vote (Wilson 2005, pp. 98–100). However, given the emerging parliamentary dominance of UR, the Kremlin needed liberal allies in the Duma only
occasionally, while the influence of the SPS on decision making was fairly limited. The liberals’ gains were minimal. Despite the SPS ‘loyalty’ strategy, the party of power still received the lion’s share of political benefits. In the 2003 State Duma election the SPS was unable to squeeze above the 5% threshold, and this failure brought the party to organisational collapse (Gel’man 2005, pp. 237–38). Although some previous leaders and activists left the party’s ranks, the SPS was able to reinvent itself: in 2005 liberals elected the new party chair, Nikita Belykh, hired a new campaign manager (the energetic Anton Bakov), and (despite the party’s name and official policy positions) actively used leftist rhetoric during regional legislative elections. Still, the most influential wing of the SPS coalesced around the architect of 1990s privatisation and the major party sponsor Anatolii Chubais and remained loyal to the Kremlin at any cost.

In the course of the 2007 State Duma election, however, the SPS suddenly shifted from ‘loyalty’ to ‘voice’. The party blamed Putin and UR for the authoritarian drift of the country, vigorously defended political freedoms, and even joined anti-regime protest rallies organised by the radical non-partisan units such as Gary Kasparov’s United Civic Front (Ob’edinennyi Grazhdanskii Front) and Eduard Limonov’s National Bolsheviks (Natsionalnaya Bolshevikskaya Partiya) (previously, the SPS stayed away from such activities). However, this ‘voice’ was raised in vain: the Kremlin argued that it was an attempt to seek revenge by those actors who had unsuccessfully ruled Russia in the 1990s, and initiated a massive negative campaign. The remaining voters of the SPS were disoriented while a new Kremlin satellite party, the Civic Force, split the liberal electorate (it received 1.1% of the vote at the polls against 0.96% for the SPS). It is too early to predict whether the SPS will survive as a political party or whether it will transform into something else. But it is clear that the very project of liberal semi-opposition has failed: Surkov was absolutely correct when he announced immediately after the 2003 State Duma elections that the liberals’ historical mission was exhausted.

Finally, Yabloko, the major (if not the only) democratic opposition party in Russia, suffered most from the political changes of the 2000s (White 2006). From the very beginning, Yabloko remained a small party, whose resources were insufficient to achieve electoral success. In a parliamentary system such a party could become a useful ally for a governmental coalition, but in Russia’s presidential system opportunities for coalition building were fairly limited. At the same time, the Kremlin actively offered Yabloko various forms of informal coalition in order to ‘swallow up’ this party via a hostile takeover. Due to these constraints, the ‘exit’ strategy was the only viable path for survival: in the 1990s Yabloko systematically and unequivocally opposed virtually all presidential and governmental proposals. Under conditions of multiple crises and fragmentation of elites this strategy brought Yabloko some short-term benefits, but the long-term costs were much higher. Despite its significant investments in party building (Hale 2004), in the 2000s Yabloko faced a deep organisational crisis: several Duma deputies and regional activists left the party ranks, it lost the financial support of major sponsors, and the threat of a hostile takeover became more dangerous. These hardships drove Yabloko to a change of strategy: from ‘exit’ to ‘loyalty’ to the Kremlin. However, it was useless: Yabloko gained little benefit from its consultations with the Kremlin, while the arrest of the major party sponsor, Mikhail Khodorkovskii in 2003 was the last blow against the party’s hopes. Yabloko’s defeat in the 2003 State Duma election, when it failed to cross the 5% threshold, was a
natural consequence of this strategic shift (Gel’man 2005, pp. 239–40). Subsequent events, such as the party’s grand failure in most regional legislative elections (Kynnev 2006), clearly indicated that Yabloko’s electoral potential was exhausted. Although some party activists and regional branches (for example, in St Petersburg) turned to street protests alongside the United Civic Front and the National Bolsheviks, the shift from ‘loyalty’ to ‘voice’ was not successful either. Yabloko was denied registration in several regional legislative elections, and its prospects looked even bleaker. In the 2007 State Duma elections, the party was merely inept and its campaign appeal was bleak: after receiving a modest 1.59% of the vote, the party’s very survival became questionable, at least in its current form.

As one can see, none of opposition parties was able to secure their positions during the 2000s. At best, they found their place at the bottom of the multi-layered pie of Russia’s party system. Their symbolical presence in national and/or regional legislatures, weak mobilisation potential and low profile in public perceptions demonstrated the deep stagnation of opposition politics. Even though these trends provoked the rise of disloyal non-party oppositions, whose street protests became visible in Russia’s major cities, such an activism cannot be seen as an effective substitute for competitive party politics. To summarise, the Kremlin’s thorough and comprehensive control over political parties might even result in the extinction of the opposition parties in the long run. However, what is good for the Kremlin is not equally good for Russia’s political development.

**Conclusion: between Mexico and the GDR?**

The early development of competitive party politics in Yel’tsin’s Russia could be seen as the manifestation of the protracted growing pains of the nascent political regime. By contrast, the demise of party competition and the emergence of a dominant party in Russia under Putin could become symptoms of it having a chronic disease. Given the lack of alternatives, one might assume that the current trends in Russia’s party system could be maintained over time. In his speech before UR party activists in February 2006, Surkov announced the Kremlin’s intention to preserve UR dominance at least for the next 10–15 years (Surkov 2006) and compared this kind of dominant party system with those in Japan under the Liberal Democrats or Sweden under the Social Democrats, which are usually labelled as ‘uncommon democracies’ (Pempel 1990). However, critics of the new party system draw many parallels with the authoritarian regime in Mexico under PRI (Gel’man 2006; Reuter & Remington forthcoming), and former State Duma deputy Vladimir Ryzhkov even dubbed it a ‘Dresden party system’, openly referring to the experience of East Germany under the GDR’s communist regime, which was familiar to Vladimir Putin during his KGB service in the 1980s (Ryzhkov 2006).

While many dominant party systems under democratic and authoritarian regimes exhibit some similarities (Greene 2007), the crucial difference lies not only in the degree of party competition, but also in the degree of autonomy of party politics from the state. While in ‘uncommon democracies’ politics beyond the dominant party is rarely damaged by the state officials (Fish 2005, pp. 57–58), party-based authoritarian regimes tend to tolerate non-dominant parties only if they do not challenge the status
quo regime. Yet, Mexican party-based authoritarianism was not overly repressive, and some autonomous parties like the right-wing National Action Party (PAN) actively operated in the political arena for decades (even though without major achievements) (Story 1986; Cothran 1994; Greene 2007). However, party-based authoritarianism in the GDR was probably one of the most repressive regimes in Eastern Europe, which completely excluded organised political activism beyond the dominant and satellite parties. In this sense, Russia’s party system, with its Kremlin-controlled hierarchy of a dominant party, its pocket satellites, and weak and impotent opponents, could be placed somewhere between Mexico and the GDR, but certainly not alongside the ‘uncommon democracies’. Despite the fact that the current state of Russia’s party system cannot be easily changed without major exogenous shocks, the comparative experience of both communist and non-communist party-based authoritarian regimes demonstrates that these party systems cannot survive indefinitely. In the long run, exogenous factors such as economic and social modernisation (Greene 2007) or international ‘linkages’ (Levitsky & Way 2006) tend to erode one-party dominance. But whether or not a return to party competition in Russia will happen under the political generations of Putin and Medvedev remains to be seen.

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References


